Events

9th online meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network:

Date: Friday, May 27, 2022.
Time: 9am – noon (China, Singapore, Taiwan & Hong Kong).

1st session: On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom
– Speaker: Bin Zhao (University of California, Irvine).
– Commentator: Ju Wang (Fudan University).

2nd session: Creating and Maintaining Scientific Categories: Values and Entrenchment
– Speaker: Soohyun Ahn (University of Calgary).
– Commentator: Yukinori Onishi (SOKENDAI/ The Graduate University for Advanced Studies).

Please register for the meeting here.

Bin Zhao (University of California, Irvine): On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom
The sensitivity account of knowledge is a modal epistemology, according to which S knows that p only if S’s belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. There are different ways to state the sensitivity condition by means of a possible worlds heuristic. The sensitivity account is thus rendered into different versions. This paper examines cases of knowledge and cases of luckily true beliefs, e.g., the Gettier cases, and argues that no version of the sensitivity account accommodates all cases. Therefore, the account is unsuccessful as an account of knowledge.

Soohyun Ahn (University of Calgary): Creating and Maintaining Scientific Categories: Values and Entrenchment
Philosophers in the values and science literature have identified various ways in which social, moral, and political values influence science. In this paper, I draw attention to another route of values affecting science: entrenchment. Case studies demonstrate that scientific categories can derive their epistemic usefulness from being firmly rooted within the society. Values can influence which category or attribute gains traction in and beyond relevant scientific domains. I identify entrenchment as an essential social mechanism for creating and maintaining projectible categories in sciences.

8th online meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network:

Date: Sunday, March 13, 2022.
Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

1st session: The Importance of Different Contexts in Mitigating Fake News Problems: A case study of fake news about COVID-19 in Thailand
– Speaker: Siraprapa Chavanayarn (Chulalongkorn University).
– Commentator: Joe Ulatowski (University of Waikato).

2nd session: The Target Audience(s) of Fake News
– Speaker: M R. X. Dentith (Beijing Normal University).
– Commentator: Zhu Xu (East China Normal University).

Please register for the meeting here.

Siraprapa Chavanayarn (Chulalongkorn University): The Importance of Different Contexts in Mitigating Fake News Problems: A case study of fake news about COVID-19 in Thailand

Abstract:  This article argues that the concept of fake news should be established based on both the “intention” of those who originally generate the news as well as the “outcome.” The intention of those generating fake news can be both deliberately deceiving and ignoring the truth whereas the outcome of the generated news is false, or partially false. Fake news potentially steers us away from knowledge. It is also difficult to distinguish fake news from other kind of testimonies due to our epistemic limitations. This article attempts to establish that the solutions to the problem of fake news should be based on contexts, because claiming universal solutions is not always applicable to all contexts. With its exclusive background, the solutions to the fake news problem in Thailand can be drawn from David Coady’s argument, coupled with an open science culture leading to an atmosphere that enables the fortification of the solutions to fake news. However, this article argues that, fake news is still a serious problem that stems from epistemic vices. Specifically, those who have epistemic vices tend not to have knowledge. Even so, those individuals incline to believe in fake news even if a large amount of justified information is available to refute the news. In order to deal with the problem of fake news that stems from epistemic vices, instead of using law enforcement, the state should reduce individual vices by non-coercive ways, such as generating or sustaining good epistemic values through education or entertainment media. This article’s arguments do not imply that the above solutions can apply in all contexts, but one should be aware that some epistemological problems cannot be solved universally without taking into account the difference in context.

M R. X. Dentith (Beijing Normal University): The Target Audience(s) of Fake News

Abstract:  Looking at the burgeoning literature on what counts as `fake news,’ I argue that we should furnish our definitions with talk of the way in which the producers of fake news intend to influence target audiences. I take it that our interest in defining `fake news’ is, at least in part, an attempt to work out how best to counteract the production of it. I will look at what distinguishes `fake news’ from other pathologies of discourse—such as biased news, bullshit, shitposting, trolling and the like—to argue why the intent to influence target audiences is an important part of what makes the production of fake news so troubling.

Epistemic Injustice Meets Asia

Saturday, February 5, 2022.

Epistemic Injustice Meets Asia is organized by Prof. Eisuke Sakakibara (University of Tokyo) and Prof. Kunimasa Sato (Ibaraki University) and co-hosted with the Asian Epistemology Network. The workshop is supported by the Mitsubishi Foundation (ID: 202020010) and a KAKENHI grant (19K12926) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

Registration link.

Time:
– The workshop schedule below is for Japan. The workshop runs from 7.30 to 10.40pm in China, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and from 6.30 – 9.40am in NYC.

Schedule:

8.30 – 8.35pm: Opening remarks

8.35 – 9.10pm: Masashi Kasaki (Hiroshima University) – Epistemic Injustice and Confucian Wisdom: A Case Study

9.10 – 9.45pm: Emily McWilliams (Duke-Kunshan University) – Testimonial Injustice: Beyond Credibility Deficits

9.45 – 10.20pm: Eisuke Sakakibara (University of Tokyo) – Epistemic Injustice in the Therapeutic Relationship in Psychiatry

10.20 – 10.40pm: Kunimasa Sato (Ibaraki University) – A Transformative Virtue that Counteracts Testimonial Injustice

10.45 – 11.40pm: Miranda Fricker (CUNY) – Legal Justice Requires Epistemic Justice
– Commentator: Rie IIzuka (Kansai University)

7th Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

Date: Sunday, November 28, 2021.
Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

Registration link.

1st session: Transformative Injustice
Speaker: Kunimasa Sato (Ibaraki University).
Commentator: Emily McWilliams (Duke-Kunshan).

2nd session: Propositional Justification is Not Necessary for Doxastic Justification
Speaker: Bada Kim (Kansas University).
Commentator: Giacomo Melis (University of Stirling).

Kunimasa Sato (Ibaraki University): Transformative Injustice
Abstract: Since Miranda Fricker presents testimonial injustice as a wrong that undermines one’s capacity as an epistemic subject, a primary harm of testimonial injustice has been understood as epistemic objectification (as argued, e.g., by Aidan McGlynn). In brief, epistemic objectification deprives one of the ability to seek truth and renders them mere objects from which perpetrators can glean information. However, Fricker also underscores another type of primary harm: inhibiting the formation of our selves or our identities due to prejudiced exclusion from “the process by which we become who we deeply, perhaps, essentially, are” (Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice, *p. 53). It seems that this primary cannot be fully explained in light of epistemic objectification, as the undermining of identity formation does not necessarily deny the subjectivity of the victims. Rather, they are granted their subjectivity in so far as they accord with the interests of the majorities and the powerful. Gaile Pohlhaus names those who suffer such mistreatment “truncated subjects.” Although Fricker considers this type of primary harm to be as serious as epistemic objectification, it has not been closely examined in subsequent literature. A possible reason for this may be that it is not obvious why a harm that inhibits one’s self-formation can be a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice. This presentation critically extends Fricker’s argument about the inhibition of one’s self-formation to articulate a distinct form of epistemic wrong: transformative injustice. First, I argue that when one is unduly excluded from trustful conversations in a thick human relationship through persistent and systematic testimonial injustice, one can be harmed epistemic self-trust (Katherine Hawley; Jeremy Wanderer). In this case, epistemic self-trust can be defined not as mere reliance on one’s epistemic faculties but as trust in oneself as an epistemic subject, and thus, it is both epistemic and personal (e.g., K. Dormandy). Second, I demonstrate that the loss of such epistemic self-trust makes one vulnerable to constitutively and causally biased construction, and consequently, this can thwart one’s potential to shape identity as a full epistemic subject. Third, I argue that the identity as an epistemic subject is transformative in that one has the potential to change earlier interests and to neutralize epistemically bad stereotypes. Hence, a primary harm that undermines such identity as an epistemic subject in persistent and systematic testimonial injustice can be construed as transformative injustice.

Bada Kim (Kansas University): Propositional Justification is Not Necessary for Doxastic Justification

Abstract: The claim that propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification has been taken for granted. In this paper, I challenge this necessity claim by providing a case of a belief that is doxastically justified without propositional justification. The case reveals that a belief can be formed in a way that satisfies a range of accounts of doxastic justification in the existing literature, even though the belief is based on evidence that is insufficient to meet either of two potential standards for propositional justification. This conclusion indicates that the relationship between the two kinds of epistemic justification is more complicated than it has traditionally been thought to be and that any epistemological theories presuming the necessity claim should be reconsidered.

6th Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

Date: Sunday, September 5, 2021.
Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

Session 1: Can Arbitrary Beliefs Be Rational?
Speaker: Mattias Skipper (National University of Singapore).
Commentator: Linton Wang (National Chung Cheng University).

Session 2: A conceptual engineering approach to understanding.
Speaker: Jenny Nado (Hong Kong University).
Commentator: Yuanfan Huang (Shanghai JiaoTong University)

Abstracts available here.

The meeting will take place through Zoom. To get the Zoom meeting link please register here (no Zoom account needed).

Book symposium: Justification as Ignorance by Sven Rosenkranz

Date: Monday, July 19, 2021.
Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

Sven Rosenkranz, Justification as Ignorance (Oxford University Press, 2021)

  • 7.00 – 7.15pm: Sven Rosenkranz (Logos, University of Barcelona) – Précis of Justification as Ignorance 
  • 7.15 – 7.30pm: Martin Smith (University of Edinburgh) – Is ~K~KP a Luminous
  • Condition?
  • 7.30 – 7.45pm: Yiwen Zhan (Peking University) – Rosenkranz on How to Be Ignorant7.45 – 8.05pm: Responses by Sven Rosenkranz
  • 8.05 – 8.30pm: Q & A
  • 8.30 – 8.45pm: Break
  • 8.45 – 9.00pm: Julien Dutant (King’s College London) – Epistemic Geach failures
  • 9.00 – 9.15pm: Dan Waxman (National University of Singapore) – J = ~K~K and logical omniscience
  • 9.15 – 9.35pm: Responses by Sven Rosenkranz
  • 35 – 10.00pm: Q & A
  •  

    The Zoom registration link is here.

    5th Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

    Date: Sunday, May 9, 2021.
    Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

    Session 1: Democracy and Epistemic Fairness: Testimonial Justice as a Founding Principle of Aggregative Democracy
    Speaker: Junyeol Kim (Kookmin University)
    Commentator: Kunimasa Sato (Ibaraki University)

    Session 2: Being self-deceived about ones own mental states
    Speaker: Kevin Lynch (Huaqiao University)
    Commentator: Winnie Sung (Nanyang Technological University)

    Abstracts available here.

    The meeting will take place through Zoom. To get the Zoom meeting link please register here (no Zoom account needed).


    4th Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

    Date: Monday, February 22, 2021.
    Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

    Session 1: Skills as Knowledge
    Speaker: Bob Beddor (National University of Singapore)
    Commentator: Yuri Cath (La Trobe University)

    Session 2: Epistemic Paternalism and Fake News
    Speaker: Shane Ryan (Nazarbayev University)
    Commentator: Michel Croce (University College Dublin)

    Abstracts available here.

    The meeting will take place through Zoom. To get the Zoom meeting link please register here (no Zoom account needed).




    3rd Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

    Date: Friday, December 18, 2020.
    Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).

    1st session: Does Science Progress?
    Speaker: Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)
    Commentators: Brad Weslake (NYU Shanghai), Xiang Huang (Fudan University)
    Note: a pre-recorded presentation is available here. The session will start with the commentators, followed by responses, and general Q & A.

    2nd session: Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck
    Speaker: Changsheng Lai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
    Commentators: Andrew Moon (Virginia Commonwealth University), Shin Sakuragi (Shibaura Institute of Technology)

    Titles and abstracts available here.

    The meeting will take place through Zoom. To get the Zoom meeting link please register here (no Zoom account needed).




    2nd Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

    Date: Thursday, October 8, 2020.
    Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).
    Meeting host: Masashi Kasaki, Nagoya University.

    1st session:
    Kok Yong Lee, National Chung Cheng University (speaker)
    Federico Luzzi, University of Aberdeen (commentator).

    2nd session:
    Olav Benjamin Vassend, Nanyang Technological University (speaker)
    Simon Goldstein, Australian Catholic University (commentator).

    Titles and abstracts available here.

    The meeting will take place through Zoom. Register here.




    1st Online Meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network

    Date: Friday, July 31, 2020.
    Time: 7-10pm (Shanghai time).
    Speakers: Adam Marushak (South China Normal University), Ru Ye (Wuhan University), Rie Iizuka (Kansai University), Masaharu Mizumoto (Japan Institute of Science and Technology).

    Programme and abstracts available here.

    Rie Iizuka handout
    Ru Ye handout
    Adam Marushak handout

    The meeting will take place through Zoom. Register here.




    Inaugural conference of the Asian Epistemology Network

    The inaugural (not online) event will take place at Zhejiang University.

    Details will be posted as they become available.

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